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Abstract
A major critique against BDI (Belief, Desire, Intention) approaches to commu-
nication is that they require strong hypotheses such as sincerity and cooperation
on the mental states of the agents (cf. for example [13,14,5]). The aim of this pa-
per is to remed this defect. Thus we study communication between heterogeneous
agents via the notion of grounding, in the sense of being publicly expressed and
established. We show that this notion is different from social commitment, from
the standard mental attitudes, and from different versions of common belief. Our
notion is founded on speech act theory, and it is directly related to the expression
of the sincerity condition [9,11,16] when a speech act is performed. We use this
notion to characterize speech acts in terms of preconditions and effects. As an ex-
ample we show how persuasion dialogues à la Walton & Krabbe can be analyzed in
our framework. In particular we show how speech act preconditions constrain the
possible sequences of speech acts.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally there are two ways to analyze dialogues: the first one is through
their structure, and the second one is through the participants’ mental states.
The former approaches analyze dialogues independently of the agents’ mental
states and focus on what a third party would perceive of it. This route is
taken by the conventional approaches such as Conte and Castelfranchi’s [3],
Walton and Krabbe’s dialogue games [19], Singh [14], and Colombetti et col.
[5,18], who study the notion of social commitment.
On the one hand, a major critique concerning the mentalist approaches
(cf. e.g. [14,5]) is that they require strong hypotheses on the architecture of
the agents’ internal state and the principles governing their behavior (such
as sincerity, cooperation, competence), while agents communicating in open
systems are heterogeneous and might thus work with very different kinds of
internal states and principles. Suppose for example a speaker asserts that p.
Then he may or may not believe that p, depending on his sincerity. The hearer
may or may not believe the speaker believes p, depending his beliefs about the
speaker’s sincerity. And if the hearer starts to believe the speaker believes p,
the hearer may or may not start to believe p himself depending on his beliefs
about the speaker’s competence.
On the other hand, a common hypothesis in formal frameworks for agent-
to-agent communication is to suppose speech acts are public, and that there is
no misperception in dialogue: perception of speech acts is sound and complete
with respect to reality.
In this paper we propose a notion of grounding which captures what
is expressed and established during a conversation between different agents
(Sect. 2). Using a particular modal operator to capture this notion (Sect. 3),
we show that it is at the borderline between mentalist and structure-based
approaches (Sect. 4). We then study a particular kind of dialogue (Walton
and Krabbe’s PPD0 persuasion dialogues) by characterizing the speech act
types that are involved there (Sect. 5). Our characterization induces a pro-
tocol governing the conversational moves. Contrarily to what is usually done
in Agent Communication Languages (ACL) this protocol is not described in
some metalanguage but on the object language level.
2 Grounding
Here we investigate the notion of grounded information, which we view as in-
formation that is publicly expressed and accepted as being true by all the agents
participating in a conversation. A piece of information might be grounded
even when some agents privately disagree, as long as they do not manifest
their disagreement.
Our notion stems from speech act theory, where Searle’s expression of an
Intentional state [11] is about a psychological state related to the state of
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the world. Even if an utterance was unsincere an Intentional State has been
expressed, and that state corresponds in some way to a particular belief of the
speaker.
The concept of groundedness applies to Moore’s paradox, according to
which one cannot successfully assert “p is true and I do not believe p”. The
paradox follows from the fact that: on the one hand, the assertion entails
expression of the sincerity condition about p (the speaker believes p); on the
other hand, the assertion expresses the speaker believes he believes p is false.
Via a principle of introspection this expresses that he believes p is false, and
the assertion is contradictory.
Vanderveken [16,17] has captured the subtle difference between expressing
an Intentional state and really being in such a state by distinguishing success
conditions from non-defectiveness conditions, thus refining the felicity condi-
tions as defined by Searle [9,10,12]. According to Vanderveken, when we assert
p we express that we believe p (success condition), while the speaker’s being
in a state of believing that p is a condition of non-defectiveness.
Whenever an agent asserts p then it is grounded that he believes that p,
independently of the agent’s individual beliefs. For a group of agents we say
that a piece of information is grounded if and only if for every agent it is
grounded that he believes it.
Groundedness is an objective notion: it refers to what can be observed,
and only to that. While it is related to mental states because it corresponds to
the expression of Intentional states, it is not an Intentional state: it is neither
a belief nor a goal, nor an intention. As we shall see, it is simple and elegant
way of characterizing mutual belief.
We believe that such a notion is interesting because it fits the public charac-
ter of speech act performance. As far as we are aware the logical investigation
of such a notion has neither been undertaken in the social approaches nor
in the conventional approaches. A similar notion has been investigated very
recently in [7], which formalizes the notions of manifested opinion in the sense
of ostensible belief and of ostensible intention.
3 Logical framework
In this section, we present a light version of the logic of belief, choice and
intention we developed in [6], augmented by a modal operator expressing
“groundedness”. In particular, we neither develop here temporal aspects nor
relations between action and mental attitudes (the frame problem for belief
and choice).
3.1 Semantics
Let AGT = {i, j, . . .} be a set of agents. We suppose AGT is finite. Let
ATM = {p, q, . . .} be the set of propositions. Complex formulas are denoted
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by A,B,C, . . .. A model includes a set of possible worlds W and a mapping
V : W → (ATM → {0, 1}) associating a valuation Vw to every w ∈ W .
Models moreover contain accessibility relations that will be detailed in the
sequel.
Belief.
In order to not only speak about facts, but also the participants’ beliefs
we introduce a modal operator of belief. Bel iA reads “agent i believes that
A holds”, or “agent i believes A”. To each agent i and each possible world
w we associate a set of possible worlds Bi(w): the worlds that are consistent
with i’s beliefs. The function Bi can be viewed as an accessibility relation. As
usual the truth condition for Bel i stipulates that it holds that A is believed by
agent i at w, noted w ° Bel iA, iff A holds in every w
′ ∈ Bi(w). We suppose
that:
Ê Bi is serial, transitive and euclidian.
Grounding.
GA reads “it is grounded (for the considered group of agents) that A is
true” (or for short : “A is grounded”). Grounded here means public and agreed
by everybody. To each world w we associate the set of possible worlds G(w)
that are consistent with all grounded propositions. G(w) contains those worlds
where all grounded propositions hold. The truth condition for G stipulates
that it holds that A is grounded in w, noted w ° GA, iff A holds in every
w′ ∈ G(w). Just as the Bi, G can be viewed as an accessibility relation. We
suppose that
Ë G is serial, transitive and euclidian.
Belief and grounding.
We postulate the following relationship between the accessibility relations
for Bi and G:
Ì if w′ ∈ Bi(w) then G(w) = G(w′)
Í if uGv and vBiw then there is w′ such that wGw′ and V (w) = V (w′)
Î G ⊆ G ◦
⋃
i∈AGT Bi
The constraint Ì stipulates that agents are aware of what is grounded and
of what is ungrounded.
The constraint Í stipulates that for every grounded proposition it is pub-
licly established that every agent believes it (which does not imply that they
actually believe them): whenever w is a world for which all believed proposi-
tions of agent i are grounded, then all those propositions are indeed grounded
in w.
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The constraint Î expresses that if a proposition is established for every
agent (i.e. it is grounded that every agent believes it) then it is grounded:
whenever w is a world for which all grounded propositions hold, then it is
indeed grounded that it is possible, for every agent, that all these propositions
hold in w.
Choice.
Among all the worlds in Bi(w) that are possible for agent i, there are some
that i prefers. Cohen and Levesque [2] say that i chooses some subset of Bi(w).
Semantically, these worlds are identified by yet another accessibility relation
Ci : W → 2
W
Ch iA expresses that agent i chooses that A. We sometimes also say that i
prefers that A 5 . Without surprise, w |= Ch iA if A holds in all preferred
worlds, i.e. w |= Ch iA if w
′ |= A for every w′ ∈ Ci(w). We suppose that
Ï Ci is serial, transitive, and euclidian. 6
Choice and belief, choice and grounding.
As said above, an agent only chooses worlds he considers possible:
Ð Ci(w) ⊆ Bi(w).
Hence belief implies choice, and choice is a mental attitude that is weaker than
belief. This corresponds to validity of the principle Bel iA→ Ch iA.
w
Ci Bi
Fig. 1. Belief and choice
We moreover require that worlds chosen by i are also chosen from i’s
possible worlds, and vice versa (see Figure 1):
Ñ if wBiw′ then Ci(w) = Ci(w′).
5 While Cohen and Levesque use a modal operator ‘goal’ (probably in order to have
a uniform denomination w.r.t. the different versions of goals they study), it seems more
appropriate to us to use the term ‘choice’.
6 This differs from Cohen and Levesque, who only have supposed seriality, and follows
Sadek’s approach. The latter [8] has argued that choice is a mental attitude which obeys
to principles of introspection that correspond with transitivity and euclideanity.
5
Gaudou, Herzig and Longin
We do not suppose any semantical constraint between choice and ground-
ing beyond those coming with the above Ci(w) ⊆ Bi(w).
Action.
Let ACT = {α, β . . .} be the set of actions. Speech acts are particular
actions; they are 4-uples of the form 〈i, j,FORCE , A〉 where i is the author of
the speech act, j its addressee, FORCE its illocutionary force, and A a formula
denoting its propositional content. For example 〈i, j,Assert, p〉 expresses that
i asserts to j that p is true. We write αi to denote that i is the author of α.
The formula AfterαA expresses that if α happens then A holds after α.
The dual HappensαA = ¬Afterα¬A means that α happens and A is true
afterwards. Hence Afterα⊥ expresses that α does not happen, and Happensα⊤
that α happens and we write then Happens(α). For every action α ∈ ACT
there is a relation R : ACT → (W → 2W ) associating sets of worlds Rα(w)
to w. The truth condition is: w ° AfterαA iff w
′
° A for every w′ ∈ Rα(w).
The formula BeforeαA means that before every execution of α, A holds.
The dual DoneαA = ¬Beforeα¬A expresses that the action α has been per-
formed before which A held. Hence Doneα⊤ means that α just has happened.
The accessibility relation for Beforeα is the converse of the above relation Rα.
The truth condition is: w ° BeforeαA iff w
′
° A for every w′ ∈ R−1α (w).
As said above, we do not detail here the relationship between action and
mental attitudes and refer the reader to [6].
3.2 Axiomatics
Belief.
The axioms corresponding to the semantical conditions for belief are those
of KD45, i.e. those of normal modal logics [1], plus the following:
Bel iA→ ¬Bel i¬A (DBeli)
Bel iA→ Bel iBel iA (4Beli)
¬Bel iA→ Bel i¬Bel iA (5Beli)
Hence an agent’s beliefs are consistent (DBeli), and he is aware of his beliefs
(4Beli) and disbeliefs (5Beli). The following are theorems of the logic:
Bel iA↔ Bel iBel iA (1)
Bel i¬Bel iA↔ ¬Bel iA (2)
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Grounding.
The logic of the grounding operator is again a normal modal logic of type
KD45:
GA→ ¬G¬A (DG)
GA→ GGA (4G)
¬GA→ G¬GA (5G)
(DG) expresses that the set of grounded informations is consistent: it can-
not be the case that both A and ¬A are simultaneously grounded.
(4G) and (5G) account for the public character of G. From these collective
awareness results: if A has (resp. has not) been grounded then it is established
that A has (resp. has not) been grounded.
The following theorems follow from (DG), (4G), and (5G):
GA↔ GGA (3)
G¬GA↔ ¬GA (4)
Belief and grounding.
In accordance with the preceding semantic conditions the following are
logical axioms:
GA→ Bel iGA (SR+)
¬GA→ Bel i¬GA (SR−)
Gϕ→ GBel iϕ, for ϕ factual (WR)
(
∧
i∈AGT
GBel iA) → GA (CG)
where a factual formula does not contain any modality.
(SR+) and (SR−) together correspond to Ì. (WR) corresponds to Í, and
(CG) to Î.
The axioms of strong rationality (SR+) and (SR−) express that the agents
are aware of the grounded (resp. ungrounded) propositions (cf. (5) and (6)
below). This is due to the public character of the grounding operator.
(WR) expresses that if the factual formula ϕ is grounded then it is neces-
sarily grounded that each agent expressed that he believes ϕ 7 . Note that this
does not imply that every agent actually believe it, i.e. (WR) does not entail
Gϕ→ Bel iϕ.
(WR) concerns only factual formulas. When an agent performs the speech
act 〈i, j,Assert, p〉, he expresses publicly that he believes p. (Bel ip is publicly
7 This axiom does not presuppose that an agent i explicitly asserted ϕ, even if, in our cur-
rent theory, we do not describe the mechanism of an agent’s implicit commitment. Moreover,
for Walton & Krabbe [19], agents can not incur implicitly strong commitments. (We will
show in Section 5 links between grounding, belief and commitments à la Walton & Krabbe.)
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established so GBel ip holds.) This does not mean that i indeed believes p: i
might ignore whether p, or even believe that ¬p. It would be hypocritical to
impose that it is grounded for another agent j that Bel ip. Therefore GBel ip→
GBel jBel ip should not be valid. Moreover, if we applied (WR) to some mental
states, we would restrict the agents’ autonomy. For example, when agent
i performs the speech act: 〈i, j,Assert,Bel jp〉 then afterwards the formula
GBel iBel jp holds, and the agent j could not later on express that he believes
¬p. Indeed, if he made this speech act, the formulae GBel j¬p and, thanks to
(WR), GBel iBel j¬p would hold, which is inconsistent with the above formula
GBel iBel jp.
(CG) expresses that if a proposition is established for every agent in
AGT then it is grounded.
The followings are straightforward consequences of (SR+) and (SR−):
GA↔ Bel iGA (5)
¬GA↔ Bel i¬GA (6)
These theorems express that agents are aware of what is grounded.
Choice.
Similar to belief, we have the (DChi), (4Chi) and (5Chi). (See [6] for more
details.)
Choice and belief.
Our semantics validates the equivalences:
Ch iA↔ Bel iCh iA (7)
¬Ch iA↔ Bel i¬Ch iA (8)
This expresses that agents are aware of their choices.
Action.
As the relation R−1α (w) is the converse of Rα, we have the two conversion
axioms:
A→ AfterαDoneαA (IAfterα,Doneα)
A→ BeforeαHappensαA (IBeforeα,Happensα)
3.3 Action laws
Action laws for an action come in two kinds: executability laws describe the
preconditions of the action, and effect laws describe the effects. The precon-
ditions of an action are the conditions that must be fulfilled in order that the
action is executable. The effects (or postconditions) are properties that hold
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after the action because of it. For example, to toss a coin, we need a coin
(precondition) and after the toss action the coin is heads or tails (postcondi-
tion).
The set of all action laws is noted LAWS , and some examples are collected
in Table 2. The general form of an executability law is:
Ch iHappens(αi) ∧ precond(αi) ↔ Happens(αi) (IntChi,αi)
This expresses a principle of intentional action: an action happens exactly
when its preconditions hold and its author chooses it to happen. The general
form of an effect law is A → Afterαpostcond(α). In order to simplify our
exposition we suppose that effect laws are unconditional and therefore the
general form of an effect law is here:
Afterαpostcond(α)
A way of capturing the conventional aspect of interaction is to suppose
that these laws are common to all the agents. Formally they are thus global
axioms to which the necessitation rule applies [4].
4 Groundedness compared to other notions
In our formalism, GBel iA → Bel iA is not valid. Thus, when it is grounded
that a piece of information A holds for agent i then this does not mean that
i indeed believes that A. The other way round, Bel iA→ GBel iA is not valid
either: an agent might believe A while it is not grounded that A holds for i.
The operator G is objective in nature. It is different from other objective
operators such as that of social commitment of [13,14,5,18]. To see this con-
sider speech act semantics: as we have shown (cf. Sect. 2), the formula GBel iA
expresses the idea that it is grounded that A holds for agent i. This has to
be linked to the expression of an Intentional state as a necessary condition for
the performance of a speech act. This means that when agent i asks agent j
to pass him the salt then it has been established either that i wants to know
whether j is able to pass him the salt (literal meaning), or that i wants j to
pass him the salt (indirect meaning). In a commitment-based approach this
typically leads to a conditional commitment (or precommitment) of j to pass
the salt, which becomes an unconditional commitment upon a positive reac-
tion. In our approach we do not try to determine whether j must do such or
such action: we just establish the facts, without any hypothesis on the agents’
beliefs, goals, intentions, . . . or commitments.
On the other hand, as the next section shows, some obligations that can
be found in commitment-based approaches have a counterpart in our formal-
ism: our characterization of speech acts in terms of preconditions and effects
constrains the agents’ options for the choice of actions, as well as their order
(cf. Sect. 5).
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In fact, the operator G expresses a sort of common belief. In [15], Tuomela
distinguishes (proper) group beliefs from shared we-beliefs. In the first case a
group may typically believe a proposition while none of the agents of the
group really believes it. In the second case, the group holds a belief which
each individual agent really holds, too.
Our operator G is closer to Tuomela’s (proper) group beliefs because the
formula GA→ Bel iA is invalid. Thus, GA means that a group [Agt] “(inten-
tionally) jointly accept A as the view of [Agt] (...) and there is a mutual belief
[about this]” [15]. Different from Tuomela we do not distinguish the agents
contributing to the grounding of the group belief from those which passively
accept it.
5 Walton&Krabbe’s persuasion dialogues (PPD0)
We now apply our formalism to a particular kind of dialogue, viz. persuasion
dialogues. We characterize the speech acts of Walton&Krabbe’s (W&K for
short) game of dialogue PPD0, also called Permissive Persuasion Dialogue.
These works mainly follow from Hamblin’s works. In order to simplify our
exposition we suppose that there are only two agents (but the account can
easily be generalized to n agents).
A persuasion dialogue takes place when there is a conflict between two
agents’ beleif. The goal of the dialogue is to resolve this situation: an agent
can persuade the other party to concede his own thesis (in this case he wins
the dialogue game) or concede the point of view of the other party (and thus
lose the game).
W&K distinguish two kinds of commitment: those which can be chal-
lenged (assertions) and those which cannot (concessions). We formalize this
distinction with the notions of strong commitment (SC ) and weak commit-
ment (WC ). They are linked by the fact that a strong commitment to a
proposition implies a weak commitment to it ([19, p. 133]). We use the logical
framework presented above to formalize these two notions, and apply it to
PPD0. In relation with this logical framework, we define:
8
SCiA
def
= GBel iA (DefSCi )
WCiA
def
= G¬Bel i¬A (DefWCi )
Note that we might have chosen to have primitive operators SCi , and
define GA as being an abbreviation of (
∧
i∈AGT SCiA).
In terms of the preceding abbreviations we can prove:
8 This is an approximation of W&K’s assertion. Indeed, our GBel iA is “more logical” than
W&K’s a(A): W&K allow both a(A) and a(¬A) to be the case simultaneously, while for us
GBel iA∧GBel i¬A is inconsistent. In the case of weak commitment, we agree with W&K’s
works: in our framework, WCiA ∧WCi¬A is consistant.
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SCiA→ ¬SCi¬A (9)
SCiA↔ SCiSCiA (10)
¬SCiA↔ SCi¬SCiA (11)
(9) shows the rationality of the agents: they cannot commit both on A
and ¬A. (10) and (11) account for the public character of commitment. With
those three theorems, we can show that SCi is an operator of a normal modal
logic of type KD45, too. 9
GA↔ SCiGA (12)
¬GA↔ SCi¬GA (13)
SCiA↔ SCj SCiA (14)
¬SCiA↔ SCj¬SCiA (15)
These theorems are some consequences of the public character of the com-
mitment. (12) and (13) entail that it is grounded that the agents are com-
mitted to the grounded (resp. ungrounded) propositions. (14) and (15) mean
that each agent is committed to the other agents commitments, and non-
commitments.
SCiA→ WCiA (16)
WCiA→ ¬SCi¬A (17)
(16) says that strong commitment implies weak commitment. (17) ex-
presses that if agent i is weakly committed to A then i is not strongly com-
mitted to ¬A.
WCiA↔ SCj WCiA (18)
¬WCiA↔ SCj¬WCiA (19)
(18) expresses that weak commitment is public. (19) is similar for absence
of weak commitment.
5.1 Speech acts and grounding
The dialogues that we want to formalize (W&K-like dialogues) are controlled
by some conventions: the rules of the game. The allowed sequences of acts are
9 We can prove that K is a theorem for SCi and that the necessitation rule can be applied
to it.
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Precond(α) Act α Postcond(α)
¬SCs p 〈s, h,Assert, p〉 SCs p
SCs p 〈s, h,SRetract, p〉 ¬SCs p
WCs p 〈s, h,WRetract, p〉 ¬WCs p
SCs p ∧ ¬WCh p 〈s, h,Argue, (q1, ..., qnSOp)〉
∧
1≤i≤n SCs qi∧
SCs (
∧
1≤i≤n qi → p)
¬WCs p 〈s, h,Concede, p〉 WCs p
¬WCs p 〈s, h,RefuseConcede, q〉 ¬WCs p
SCs q ∧ ¬WCh q ∧ ¬WCh p 〈s, h,RequestConcede, p〉 ∅
¬WCs p ∧ SCh p∧ 〈s, h,Challenge, p〉 ∅
¬GDone〈s,h,Challenge,p〉⊤
¬WCh p 〈s, h,Serious, p〉 ∅
WCh p ∧WCh q ∧ (p↔ ¬q) 〈s, h,Resolve, p〉 ∅
Table 1
Preconditions and effects of speech acts (with commitments).
those of W&K’s PPD0 (cf. [19, p. 150-151]). They are formalized in Figure 2
and will be discussed below. For example, after a speech act 〈s, h,Assert, p〉,
Resolve(p)
Concede(p)
Argue(q1, . . . , qnSOp)
RequestConcede(p)
Serious(p)
RefuseConcede(p)
Challenge(p)
Assert(p)
SRetract(p)
WRetract(p)
Possible moves
Additional possible moves
Fig. 2. (Additional) possible moves after each act
the hearer can only challenge p or concede it. We formalize them in our logic
by expressing that an act grounds that the hearer’s choices are limited only to
some acts. Speech acts have two different effects: one is on the commitment
store in terms of weak and strong commitments (cf. Table 1) and the other
one is the set of acts the hearer can perform in response (cf. Table 2).
12
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We suppose that initially nothing is grounded, i.e. the belief base is {¬GA :
A is a formula }. 10
Acts α Constraints on the possible actions following α
〈s, h,Assert, p〉 G(ChhHappens(〈h, s,Challenge, p〉)∨
ChhHappens(〈h, s,Concede, p〉))
〈s, h,SRetract, p〉 ∅
〈s, h,WRetract, p〉 ∅
〈s, h,RequestConcede, p〉 G(ChhHappens(〈h, s,RefuseConcede, p〉)∨
ChhHappens(〈h, s,Concede, p〉))
〈s, h,Argue, (q1, ..., qnSOp)〉
∧
1≤i≤nG(ChhHappens(〈h, s,Challenge, qi〉)∨
ChhHappens(〈h, s,Concede, qi〉))
∧G(ChhHappens(〈h, s,Challenge, q1 ∧ ... ∧ qn → p〉)∨
Happens(〈h, s,Concede, q1 ∧ ... ∧ qn → p〉))
〈s, h,Challenge, p〉 G(ChhHappens(〈h, s,SRetract, p〉)∨
ChhHappens(〈h, s,WRetract, p〉)∨
ChhHappens(〈h, s,Argue, (q1, ..., qnSOp)〉)∨
ChhHappens(〈h, s,Serious, p〉))
〈s, h,Concede, p〉 ∅
〈s, h,RefuseConcede, p〉 ∅
〈s, h,Serious, p〉 G(ChhHappens(〈h, s,RefuseConcede, p〉)∨
ChhHappens(〈h, s,Concede, p〉))
〈s, h,Resolve, p〉 G(ChhHappens(〈h, s,WRetract, p〉)∨
ChhHappens(〈h, s,WRetract,¬p〉))
Table 2
Additional postconditions of speech acts.
The Assert act on p can only be used by the two parties in some preliminary
moves of the dialogue to state the theses of each participant. The effect of
the act is that it is grounded that its content p holds for the speaker: he has
expressed a kind of strong commitment (an assertion for W&K) on p in the
sense that he must defend his commitment by an argument if it is challenged.
10 This is an infinite set. In practice one would resort to default reasoning here.
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To Concede p means to admit that p could hold, where p has been asserted
by the other party. The effect of this act is that it is grounded that the speaker
has taken a kind of commitment on p. But the nature of this commitment is
not the same as the former one: this one has not to be defended when it is
attacked. W&K call it concession and it corresponds to our notion of Weak
Commitment.
The Challenge act on p forces the other participant to either put forward
an argument for p, or to retract the assertion p. For a given propositional
content this act can only be performed once.
Argue: to defend a challenged assertion p, an argument must have p as
conclusion and a set of propositions q1...qn as premises. We write it as follows:
q1...qnSOp
def
= q1 ∧ ... ∧ qn ∧ (q1 ∧ ... ∧ qn → p) (DefSO)
The effect of this act is that all premises q1, ..., qn and the implicit implication
q1 ∧ ... ∧ qn → p are grounded for the speaker. It follows that the challenger
must explicitly take position in the next move (challenge or concede) on each
premise and on the implicit implication. To challenge one premise means that
the argument cannot be applied, while to challenge the implicit implication
means that the argument is incorrect. If he does not challenge a proposition,
he (implicitly) concedes it. But as soon as he has conceded all the premises
and the implication, he must also concede the conclusion. To avoid some di-
gressions, W&K suppose that an unchallenged assertion cannot be defended
by an argument. Moreover, we took over their form of the support of ar-
guments, viz. A → B, although we are aware that more complex forms of
reasoning occur in real world argumentation.
At any time, the speaker may request more concessions (with a Request-
Concede act) from the hearer, to use them as premises for arguments. The
hearer can then accept or refuse to concede.
W&K use the same speech act type to retract a concession and to refuse to
concede something (the act nc(p)). But it seems to us that it is not the same
kind of act, and we decided to create two different acts: 〈s, h,WRetract, p〉 to
retract one of his own weak commitments, and 〈s, h,RefuseConcede, p〉 to
decide not to concede anything. A strong commitment can be retracted with
a 〈s, h, SRetract, p〉. This act removes the strong commitment from the com-
mitment store, but not the weak commitment, whereas the 〈s, h,WRetract, p〉
act removes the weak commitment and, if it exists, the strong commitment,
too.
In our logic, WCiA∧WCi¬A is satisfiable, but not SCiA∧SCi¬A. Thus
we are more restrictive than W&K: in the following, a contradiction in an
agents’ commitment store is only due to contradictory Weak Commitments. 11
11 W&K allow the agents to have some contradictory concessions (WC ) and assertions
(SC ) in their commitment store (i.e. SCiA and SCi¬A or WCiA and WCi¬A can hold
simultaneously).
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When a party detects an contradiction in the other party’s commitment store,
it can ask him to resolve it (with the act Resolve(p,q) where “p and q are
explicit contradictories” [19, p. 151].). The other party must retract one of the
inconsistent propositions. W&K do not make any inference in the commitment
store, so Resolve only applies to explicit inconsistency (that is: Resolve(p,¬p)).
We will write Resolve(p) instead of Resolve(p,q) where q is ¬p. (Resolve(p) and
Resolve(¬p) are thus equivalent.) To perform the speech act Resolve(p), we
can show that it is necessary and sufficient that the propositions p and ¬p are
weak commitments of the agent. In our formalism, the act Resolve holds only
to weak commitments. Moreover the two contradictory weak commitments
cannot be derived from two inconsistent strong commitments (which W&K
allow), because such are consistent in our logic.
When an agent chooses to challenge a proposition p or to refuse to concede
it, his opponent can query him to reassess his position. Finally the speech act
Serious(p) imposes that the agent must concede p or refuse to concede it.
Note that W&K define another commitment store that contains what they
call dark-side commitments. If p is a dark-side commitment, it must be re-
vealed after a Serious(p) and the agent must concede p and cannot retract
it. We do not consider such commitments here because, we focus on what is
observable and objective in the dialogue: so if an agent chooses to concede
p, we do not know if it was a dark-side commitment or not, consequently the
agent may, even if it had a dark-side commitment on p and contrary to W&K’s
theory, retract it in a subsequent dialogue move dialogue.
The action preconditions are not mutually exclusive. This gives the agents
some freedom of choice. We do not describe here the subjective cognitive
processes that lead an agent to a particular choice.
5.2 Example
We recast an example of a persuasion dialogue given by W&K [19, p. 153]
to illustrate the dialogue game PPD0 (see Figure 3): initially, agent i asserts
p1 and agent j asserts p2. Thus, the following preparatory moves have been
performed: 〈i, j,Assert, p1〉 and 〈j, i,Assert, p2〉.
After each move, the agents’ commitment stores are updated (see Table
3). In his first move, j asks i to concede p3 and challenges p1. i responds by
conceding p3, etc. In move (vii), agent j concedes p1 which is the thesis of his
opponent. 12
As we have said, in order to stay consistent with our logical framework, we
have to add an effect to the W&K speech act of concession: when i concedes
a proposition p, every strong commitment of i on ¬p is retracted. Agent i is
then weakly committed on both p and ¬p. We thus weaken the paraconsistent
aspects of W&K, viz. that an agent can have assertions or concessions that
12 He thus loses the game in what concerns the thesis of i but in what concerns his own
thesis, the game is not over yet.
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(i) 〈j, i,RequestConcede, p3〉,
〈j, i,Challenge, p1〉
(ii) 〈i, j,Concede, p3〉,
〈i, j,Serious, p1〉,
〈i, j,Argue, (p3SOp1)〉,
〈i, j,Challenge, p2〉
(iii) 〈j, i,RefuseConcede, p1〉,
〈j, i,Concede, p3 → p1〉,
〈j, i,Argue, (p4, p5SOp2)〉,
〈j, i,Challenge, p3〉
(iv) 〈i, j,Concede, p5〉,
〈i, j,Concede, p4 ∧ p5 → p2〉,
〈i, j,Serious, p3〉,
〈i, j,Argue, (¬p4, p5SOp3)〉,
〈i, j,Challenge, p4〉
(v) 〈j, i,WRetract, p3 → p1〉,
〈j, i,Concede, p3〉,
〈j, i,Concede,¬p4〉,
〈j, i,Concede,¬p4 ∧ p5 → p3〉,
〈j, i,Argue, (p3SOp4)〉,
〈j, i,Challenge, p3 → p1〉
(vi) 〈i, j,Resolve, p4〉,
〈i, j,Argue, (¬p4SOp3 → p1)〉,
〈i, j,Challenge, p3 → p4〉
(vii) 〈j, i,WRetract, p4〉,
〈j, i,WRetract, p3 → p4〉,
〈j, i,SRetract, p5〉,
〈j, i,SRetract, p3〉,
〈j, i,WRetract, p4 ∧ p5 → p2〉,
〈j, i,Concede,¬p4 → (p3 → p1)〉,
〈j, i,Concede, p3 → p1〉,
〈j, i,Concede, p1〉,
〈j, i,Argue, (p6SOp2)〉,
Fig. 3. Example of dialogue (see [19, p. 153])
are jointly inconsistent, in order to keep in line with standard properties of
the modal operator G.
Now we can establish formally that our logic captures W&K’s PPD0-
dialogues. For example we have:
Theorem 5.1
LAWS |=After 〈s,h,Assert,p〉((¬WCh p ∧ ¬Done〈h,s,Challenge,p〉⊤) →
G(Happens(〈h, s,Challenge, p〉) ∨ Happens(〈h, s,Concede, p〉)))
Thus after an assertion of p the only possible reactions of the hearer are
to either challenge or concede p, under the condition that he has not doubted
that ¬p, and that he has not challenged p in the preceding move.
Proof. LAWS contains (see Table 2) the formula
After 〈s,h,Assert,p〉G(ChhHappens(〈h, s,Challenge, p〉)∨
ChhHappens(〈h, s,Concede, p〉))
The precondition for 〈h, s,Challenge, p〉 is
¬WCh p ∧ SCs p ∧ ¬Done〈h,s,Challenge,p〉⊤
Now the postcondition of 〈s, h,Assert, p〉 is SCs p. Hence we have by the law
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Grounded propositions SCi WCi SCj WCj
∅ p1 p2
WCi p3 p1, p2
SCi p3,SCi p3 → p1 p3, p3 → p1
WCj p3 → p1,SCj p4, p2, p4, p5 p3 → p1
SCj p5,SCj p4 ∧ p5 → p2 p4 ∧ p5 → p2
WCi p5,WCi p4 ∧ p5 → p2 p1, p3, p3 → p1 p5
SCi¬p4,SCi p5, ¬p4, p5, p4 ∧ p5 → p2
SCi¬p4 ∧ p5 → p3 ¬p4 ∧ p5 → p3
¬SCj p3 → p1,WCj p3, p2, p4, p5, p3 ¬p4
WCj ¬p4 ∧ p5 → p3, p4 ∧ p5 → p2, ¬p4 ∧ p5 → p3
SCj p3,SCj p3 → p4, p3 → p4
WCj ¬p4
SCi¬p4, p1, p3, p3 → p1 p5
SCi¬p4(→ p3 → p1) ¬p4, p5, p4 ∧ p5 → p2
¬p4 ∧ p5 → p3
¬p4(→ p3 → p1)
¬SCj p4,¬WCj p4 p2 ¬p4
¬WCj p3 → p4,¬SCj p3 p6, p6 → p2 ¬p4 ∧ p5 → p3
¬SCj p3 → p4,¬SCj p5 p3, p5,
¬WCj p4 ∧ p5 → p2, ¬p4 → (p3 → p1)
¬SCj p4 ∧ p5 → p2 p3 → p1, p1
WCj p3 → p1,WCj p1
WCj ¬p4 → (p3 → p1)
SCj p6,SCj p6 → p2
Table 3
Commitment stores in the example dialogue
of intentional action (IntChi,αi):
LAWS |=After 〈s,h,Assert,p〉(¬WCh p ∧ ¬Done〈h,s,Challenge,p〉⊤ →
(ChhHappens(〈h, s,Challenge, p〉) → Happens(〈h, s,Challenge, p〉)))
17
Gaudou, Herzig and Longin
Similarly, for concede we have:
LAWS |= After 〈s,h,Assert,p〉(¬WCh p→ (ChhHappens(〈h, s,Concede, p〉) →
Happens(〈h, s,Concede, p〉)))
Combining these two with the law of intentional action for Assert we obtain
our theorem. 2
Similar results for the other speech acts can be stated. They formally
express and thus make more precise further properties of W&K’s dialogue
games. For example, the above theorem illustrates something that remained
implicit in W&K’s PPD0 dialogues: the hearer of an assertion that p should
not be committed that p himself because, if he were not, the dialogue would
no more be a persuasion dialogue and no rule would apply.
Similarly, in a context where h’s commitment store contains SCh (p ∨ q),
SCh¬p, and SCh¬q (and is thus clearly inconsistent), W&K’s dialogue rules
do not allow s to execute 〈s, h,Resolve, p∨q,¬p∧¬q〉. This seems nevertheless
a natural move in this context. Our formalization allows for it, the formal
reason being that our logic of G is a normal modal logic, and thus validates
(SCi p ∧ SCi q) → SCi (p ∧ q).
6 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is the definition of a logic of grounding.
We have shown that this notion has its origins in speech act theory [16,17],
philosophy of mental states [11], and in philosophy of social action [15]. It is
thus a philosophically well-founded notion.
Our formalisation is new as far as we are aware. Just as the structural
approaches to dialogue it requires no hypotheses on the internal principles of
the agents and accounts for the observation of a dialogue by a third party.
Our characterization of speech acts is limited to the establishment of what
must be true in order to avoid self-contradictions of the speaker.
We think that our work is very close of the notion of ostensible mental
states of [7] and that our works could converge to very interesting results, for
example on the definition of the semantics of a speech acts library.
Another feature of our notion is that it bridges the gap between men-
talist and structural approaches to dialogue, by accounting for an objective
viewpoint on dialogue by means of a logic involving belief.
We did not present a formal account of the dynamics. This requires the
integration of a solution to the classical problems in reasoning about actions
(frame problem, ramification problem, and belief revision). These technical
aspects will be described in future work.
Once we have such a formalism at our disposal it can be used to anal-
yse dialogue corpora in order to formally derive whether some proposition is
18
Gaudou, Herzig and Longin
grounded or not for the participants. This could provide then an explanation
for some cases of misunderstanding.
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